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Less State Intervention and
Greater State Assistance
Equals Greater Maternal Rights and
Less Prenatal Abuse
by CeciliaMcGraw*

Introduction
Should the state intervene in the life of a pregnant woman and
intrude upon her constitutional rights in order to prevent prenatal
abuse? This Article will argue, in a three part analysis, that the
state can better protect the unborn from harm through assistance
to the mother and support of the unique relationship between the
mother and her unborn.
First, the Article will focus on the extent to which states now
intervene in the life of a pregnant woman when she refuses medical
treatment deemed necessary to the fetus. Current state intervention
may take the form of a court ordered cesarean section when the
mother objects to medical care considered to be of benefit to the
unborn. Further, Part I will examine the move towards imposing,
over the objections of the mother, more invasive and experimental
medical interventions. These potential interventions may be made
possible by either the broad interpretation of existing child abuse
and neglect statutes, or the adoption of a current legislative
proposal.
Finally, the' first section will conclude that state
intervention in the area of mvasive medical care for the fetus must
be limited, since interventions not only violate a woman's
constitutional rights, but also may involve grave risks to the mother
with questionable benefits to the fetus.
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The second part of this analysis will examine how states now
deal with maternal drug abuse, both in terms of the detention of
women during their prenancies and the removal of their children
after birth. Part II will propose that less invasive alternatives are
available to enable states to deal with the problem of maternal drug
abuse, such as education about the effects of substance abuse on
the unborn and drug rehabilitation programs.
Part II will also discuss the current lean towards the prosecution
of women who abuse drugs and fail to follow their doctors' orders.
It will consider the effect of a recent legislative proposal designed
to empower the state to prosecute a woman for any prenatal
conduct that causes harm to her fetus. This section will argue that
a state goes too far when it files criminal charges against a woman
for any behavior which causes harm to the fetus, since such a policy
is overbroad and violates a woman's constitutional rights to privacy,
parental autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom from bodily
restraint.
This prosecution would not be the constitutionally
mandated "least intrusive means" of protecting the unborn, would
not protect the unborn, and might even harm the unborn.
The third and final part of this analysis will argue that limited
state intervention and greater state assistance will protect the
interests of both the mother and the unborn child. Since the needs
of the unborn cannot be met unless the needs of its mother are
met, states should assist mothers by providing them with prenatal
care, counseling, and drug education and rehabilitation. State
intervention in the form of prosecution, detention, and removal does
not meet the needs of the mother, may harm the fetus, and violates
a woman's constitutional rights. Medical decisions made by pregnant
women must be respected. Since the relationship of the mother and
her unborn is a unique one, it must be supported rather than
interfered with by the state.
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I
State Intervention - Medical Treatment

A. Current Status
1. ParensPatriaePower
The states have argued that their authority to protect the
unborn derives from the doctrine of parens patriae. 1 Parens patriae
has been defined as the inherent power and authority of a state
legislature to protect children or individuals who are not able to
make decisions in their own best interests. 2 Pursuant to this
authority, state legislatures have drafted child abuse and neglect
statutes. Typically, the statutes require the parents of a minor child
to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter, and medical attendance.
These statutes either explicitly provide for the unborn, or they may
3
be construed to include the unborn.
Thus, when a mother refuses to consent to medical care that is
essential to prevent serious fetal injury or death, state authorities
may seek to intervene on the basis that refusal constitutes child
neglect or abuse. For example, courts have used child abuse
statutes to compel women to submit to cesarean sections which were
4
thought to be in the interest of the fetus.
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, a
pregnant woman was advised by her doctor to deliver her baby by
cesarean section, since her unborn child had only a 50% chance of
surviving a vaginal delivery.' The woman objected to the cesarean

1. McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla. 1, 12, 205 P. 917, 925 (1922); In re Weberlist, 360 N.Y.S.2d

783, 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
2 Id
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517,
521, 171 A.2d 140, 144 (1961) (statutory provisions apply to the unborn child); In re Ruiz,
27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ct. Corn. P1. 1986).
4 See In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Jackson County P. Ct. May 24, 1982); In re A.C.,
No. 87-609 (D.C. Ct. Appeals, Nov. 10, 1987).
5 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 87, 274 S.E.2d 457, 458
(Ga. Sup. Ct. 1981).
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section.6 The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the unborn
child had been denied the proper parental care and subsistence
necessary for its life and health when its mother refused to deliver
by cesarean section. 7 The court determined that the unborn child
was entitled to the protection of the Juvenile Court Code of
Georgia, and that, therefore, the court could intervene to protect
the fetus and compel the cesarean section over the mother's
objections.8
2. Critique
These intrusive and involuntary procedures performed for the
benefit of the fetus directly violate the mother's constitutional fights
to privacy, bodily integrity, freedom from bodily restraint, and
parental autonomy.
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court recognized
that the right to privacy may be found either in the fourteenth
amendment's concept of personal liberty, or in the ninth
amendment's reservation of rights to the people.9 The broad outline
of the Court's holding is as follows:
1. The right to privacy is broad enough to include a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy without interference prior to
the end of the first trimester. 0
2. Fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to privacy
may be limited by a compelling state interest when limitations are
narrowly drawn, and the state's interest outweighs the mother's
constitutional rights."
3. The state has a compelling interest in protecting the unborn
once it reaches the point of viability.' 2 This is the point at which

6 Ia
7 IA at 459.

8 Id.
9 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
10 Id. at 154, 164.
11 IdMat 155, 164.
12 Id. at 163.
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3
the fetus is capable of life independent of its mother.
4. The state may limit a woman's privacy and prohibit abortion
at the point of viability, except when it is necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother. 14
Thus, the Court held that, even when the fetus has become viable,
the state's compelling interest in potential life does not outweigh the
mother's interest in her own life and health.
In addition, the right of privacy protects intimate family decisions
concerning procreation and child bearing against government
intrusion." Apparently, then, a pregnant woman has a constitutional
right to privacy in decisions affecting her pregnancy. It follows that
a pregnant woman's right of privacy includes her right to decide
whether or not to accept medical treatment. Since the state does
not have a compelling interest until the unborn reaches the point of
viability, the state cannot order medical procedures against a
pregnant woman's will prior to this point. Therefore, the right of
privacy includes the right to refuse a cesarean section delivery when
the woman's own life and health could be jeopardized by the
medical procedure.
A cesarean section delivery involves major surgery. The
procedure requires a woman to submit to general anesthesia while
an incision is made into her abdominal and uterine walls. 16 As with
any major surgery, it involves a painful recovery, as well as a risk of
infection, bleeding, and death. 17 -Thus, even when a state has a
compelling interest in providing this arguably safer method of
delivery for the benefit of a viable fetus, this interest does not
outweigh the mother's constitutional rights when the cesarean
section delivery could threaten her own health and life.
The fourteenth amendment protects an individual's rights to be
free from the nonconsensual invasion of bodily integrity and
unwarranted bodily restraint. 8 The right to bodily integrity includes

13 Id.
14 Id. at 164.
15 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
16 PRrTCHAm, MAcDoNALD, GANr, WiLLAms Oasmmrrcs 867 (17th ed. 1985).
17 Id at 868-69.
18 Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424
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the right to possession and control of one's own person. 19 It is the
right to be free from all restraint and interference.20
The
fundamental right to bodily integrity and freedom from bodily
restraint includes a woman's right to refuse to be detained within
the hospital environment and to refuse medical treatment.21 Like
the right of privacy, these rights outweigh a state's compelling
interest in the performance of a cesarean section delivery when
restraint and invasion of a pregnant woman's bodily integrity might
risk her own life and health.
Finally, a mother has a constitutional right to parental autonomy
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2-' It
confers upon the mother the right to the care and custody of her
children, to "direct the upbringing" of her children under her
control.23 A state cannot unreasonably interfere with this right.24
Since a mother cannot direct the upbringing of her child without
making important decisions concerning his or her welfare, the state
cannot unreasonably interfere with a mother's decisions concerning
the welfare of her unborn child. Therefore, if a mother feels that
a cesarean section is not warranted or necessary to the delivery of
her child, the state may not compel such a delivery. It would be
unreasonable to force a pregnant woman against her will to undergo
major surgery which could risk her health or life.
In sum, for the purpose of protecting the fetus, a state cannot
force a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section when the
treatment in question puts the health or life of the woman at risk.
A state that compels this intervention notwithstanding the woman's
rights to privacy, parental autonomy, bodily integrity, and freedom
from bodily restraint, violates the woman's constitutional rights

(1977); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195 (1984); see generally Nelson,
Buggy and Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each lo Live
as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HASr-NGs L. J. 703 (1986).
19 Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
20 Id.
21 Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.Supp. 1131 (D.NJ. 1978).
22 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
23 Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
24 Id at 535.
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guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
B. Possible Future State Intervention in the Area of Medical
Treatment
1. Broad Interpretation of Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes
Some states have compelled women against their wills to submit
to cesarean section deliveries on the theory that because the fetus
is viable, the state's interest in potential life outweighs the mother's
constitutional rights. s A question that follows is whether states also
have the power to compel a mother to submit to newly developed
diagnostic tests and surgical interventions designed specifically to
treat the fetus in utero. Pediatric surgeons are now capable of
removing a fetus from its mother's uterus by cesarean section,
performing surgery on the fetus in order to correct some defect, and
then replacing the fetus in its mother's-uterus until its birth.
Surgical treatment of the fetus may include, but is not limited to,
the correction of hernias, blocked bladders, neural tube defects, and
fluid build-up in the brain.2 Extrauterine fetal surgery, like a
cesarean section, requires the mother to submit to general
anaesthesia and major surgery 7 Given the intrusive nature of a
cesarean section, it may well serve as a precedent for compelling
fetal surgery when it is in the interest of the fetus to do so.28 By
broadly interpreting child abuse and neglect statutes, it is possible
that the courts could enforce the implementation of prenatal
medicine and fetal surgery over the objections of the mother.

25 Supra notes 4-8.
26 Schiavoni, Individual Reprodsctive Rights v. State Interests, WlSe. BAR. BULL, Sept.
1986, at 18, col. 3.
27 Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty andthe Controlof Conception,Pregnancy,and Childbirth,
69 VA. L REV. 405, 446 (1983).
28 See Schiavoni, supra note 26 at 20, col. 1.

,
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2. Legislative ProposalMade by Fetal Rights Advocates
Proponents of fetal rights contend that once a woman decides
to carry a child to term, she assumes a moral responsibility and must
defer her rights to those of the developing fetus. 29 In furtherance
of this conviction, Robert Masterson, a California attorney and fetal
rights advocate, drafted legislation which would enable the state to
detain a pregnant woman in a medically controlled environment for
various reasons. The woman could be detained if she disagreed with
her doctor regarding a diet plan, used inappropriate drugs, or
otherwise failed to protect her unborn against potential injury.
According to Masterson's proposal, a mother's failure to protect her
unborn against potential injury might include her refusal to submit
to newly developed diagnostic and surgical interventions, designed
specifically to aid the unborn, such as extrauterine fetal surgery.30
The state would implement this plan by declaring the fetus an
unborn child without proper parental care and, accordingly, a ward
of the juvenile court. The state could assert its authority any time
the mother refused medical care or disagreed with her doctor's
treatment plan if the doctor believed this care or treatment was
necessary to the health of the fetus.31 Since the fetus cannot bephysically separated from its mother, an order declaring the fetus a
ward of the juvenile court would detain the mother as well.
John Myers, another fetal rights advocate and professor at
McGeorge School of Law in Sacramento, California, argues that, in
certain circumstances, a pregnant woman should be required, even
against her will, to submit to surgery on her fetus' behalf.32 For
example, surgeons can now operate on fetuses suffering from
hydrocephalus, a condition of excessive fluid in the brain which can
cause severe brain damage.33 Myers observed that the forced
intervention, while regrettable, was necessary because a "child has
29 Begley, Wingert, Huck, Quade, The Troubling Question of 'Fetal Rights, Should
Denying Care to the Unborn Be a Crime?, NEwswEEK, Dec. 8, 1986, at 87, col. 2.
30 Takas, Women and Law, Voout, May 1987, at 148, cols. 1-2.
31 Id
.32 Id at col. 2.
33 Id.
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a right to be born with a sound mind and body."M

3. Citique
Fetal surgery can be risky to both the mother and her unborn.
With any major surgery, such as a cesarean section delivery or
extrauterine fetal surgery, there is a possibility that the mother
might not survive the surgical procedure or general anaesthesia.
The safety and efficacy of many surgical interventions on behalf of
For example, one
the fetus have not been established. 35
hydrocephalic's head was punctured six times between the twentyfifth and thirty-second weeks of pregnancy to withdraw fluid.3
Despite this treatment, the baby was born with severe brain damage
and other disabilities.37 Indeed, fetal surgery is not always successful
Mary Bedard,
and the outcome is often unpredictable.
neonatologist at the Children's Hospital of Michigan, feels it would
be inappropriate under any circumstances to compel a woman to
undergo fetal surgery since it is highly experimental.3
Throughout medical history are cases where treatments once
considered "cure-alls" were later found to cause more problems than
those they originally sought to cure. For instance, in the 1950s
doctors prescribed diethylstilbestrol (DES) to many women for the
purpose of preventing miscarriages. 9 The daughters born to these
women are more likely than those not affected by DES to suffer
from cervical cancer 0 Thalidomide, also administered to pregnant
women in the past in order to prevent miscarriage, caused
devastating seal-limb deformities in the children born to these
women.41 To the same effect, attorney Janet Gallagher conducted

34 M
35 Hubard, The Fetus as Patient, Ms., Oct. 1982, at 32.
36 I&

37 Id
38 Takas, supra note 30, col. 2.
39 Sandroff, Invasion of the Body Snatchers, VoGuE, Oct. 1988, at 331, col. 2.

40 I&
41 REEDsR, MASmOiAmNN,
1976).

MARIN AND FnTzPATRiCK, MATE.Nrry NURSING

611 (13th ed.
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a study finding that "in six out of eleven cases of requests for courtordered cesarean section deliveries, the women went on to successful
vaginal births."42 A physician's opinion may be valuable but it is not
unerring.
Indeed, even the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology
(ACOG) advises against court-ordered medical procedures
implemented to treat the fetus.43 ACOG encourages physicians to
seek the mother's consent, through education and counseling, to
medical procedures believed to be beneficial to the"fetus, when the
mother objects to such regimens. 44 ACOG concluded that "resort
to the court is almost never justified."45
Not only is resort to the courts unjustified, but it also should be
unsuccessful. A state that compels a pregnant woman to undergo
fetal surgery violates her constitutional rights to privacy, bodily
integrity, freedom from bodily restraint and parental autonomy,
unless the state first proves it has a compelling interest which
outweighs the mother's constitutional rights. 46 While the state may
have a compelling interest in fetal surgery to preserve the life and
health of a viable fetus, this interest does not outweigh the mother's
constitutional rights when the surgery might risk her own life and
health. In addition, since fetal surgery may present risks to the life
and health of the unborn as well as to the life and health of the
mother, the state's interest may be less compelling than if the
surgery were safe.
The broad interpretation of child abuse and neglect statutes or
the adoption of Masterson's legislative proposal might give states
the power to compel, over a pregnant woman's objections, surgical
interventions designed to treat the fetus in utero. Given the grave
risks that major surgery may pose to mother and child, the
questionable benefits as well as success rates of fetal surgery, and
the susceptibility of medical technology and judgment to human

42 Sandroff, supra note 39, col. 1.
43 Gianeli, ACOG Issues Guidelines on Materna FetalRights, 30 AM. MED. NEws, Aug.
28, 1987, at 7, cols. 1-3.
44 Id at col. 3.
45 Id
46 Supra note 11.
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error, major surgery should be held out as a choice to women and
not be made compulsory. Whose life is it anyway? And whose
baby?
HI
State Intervention - Drug Abuse
A. Current Status
1. DrugAbuse Problem
The use of drugs by a pregnant Woman can produce crippling
and often fatal fetal defects. The vulnerability of the unborn to
drugs has been demonstrated repeatedly. Prescription drugs, such
as sedatives and tranquilizers, as well as heroin and morphine, all
may lead to physical and mental defects in the child.47 - Excessive
alcohol intake during pregnancy may result in physical growth
retardation, particularly of the heart and skeletal systems of the
fetus, in addition to mental retardation.4
Growing numbers of women are using crack, the cheap and
readily available purified form of cocaine. In 1988, about 20% of
all babies born at Highland General Hospital in Oakland, California,
were harmed by the effects of crack.49 Even one "hit" of crack can
cause irreparable harm to a fetus. 0 At birth, the babies are
irritable, have tremors, and are lethargic.5 ' They may experience
periods of uncontrollable crying and unresponsiveness. 2 Head and
brain size may be impaired; they may suffer from strokes and
seizures, and their kidneys, genitals, intestines, and spinal cords may
be malformed. 5 3

47

SANDBERG,

SYNOPSIS OF On sm'cs 124 (10th ed. 1978).

48 Id at 118.
49 Langone, Crack Comes to the Nursery, TIME, Sept. 19, 1988, at 85, col. 1.
50 Id at col. 3.
51 Id
52 Id
53 Id at col. 2.
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The use of cocaine in the United States is increasing. 4 Because
many cocaine users are young women of reproductive age, it is
inevitable that some women who use cocaine will become pregnant.
In a study conducted of 36 U.S. hospitals, Dr. Ira Chasnoff of
Chicago's Northwestern Memorial Hospital reported that at least
11% of 155,000 pregnant women surveyed had exposed their unborn
babies to illegal drugs, cocaine being by far the most common drug
used. 55
2. Civil Intervention
a. Detention of Pregnant Women and Removal of their
Infants
In response to these frightening statistics, courts have used child
abuse and neglect statutes to detain pregnant women who abuse
drugs or engage in activities that might harm their unborn. By
designating the fetus as "a child in need of protective services"
because of the mother's drug abuse, courts have seized custody of
the fetus, thereby detaining the mother.56 For example, a Wisconsin
court ordered that a pregnant sixteen year-old woman and habitual
runaway be placed in secpre detention until the birth of her fetus.
The court found that her toxemic condition could cause premature
57
labor, presenting a danger to the fetus.
Once a woman gives birth, instead of detaining her, states may
seek to take the infant from her. In re Baby X held that the
newborn's symptoms of narcotics withdrawal established sufficient
evidence of its mother's prenatal neglect to justify the court's taking
temporary custody of the baby.58 The court concluded that prenatal
conduct causing postpartum injury could constitute child abuse within
the meaning of the probate code. This determination would be

54 Id. at col. 1.

55 Id56 See Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's ConstitutionalRights
to Liberty, Privacy, & Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 599, 605 (1986).
57 Unreported case, Wankesha County Circuit Ct., Aug. 9, 1985.
58 In re Baby X, 9 Mich.App. 111, 116, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (1980).
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considered in deciding- whether the mother should be permanently
deprived of the custody of her child.59 In re Ruiz likewise
determined that an infant born to a mother addicted to heroin was
abused by the mother within the meaning of the child abuse
statute. 60 The court held that the unborn child was entitled to legal
protection under the statute which would permit the state to take
custody of the child.6'
b. Critique
The detention and monitoring of pregnant women who abuse
drugs, as well as the removal of babies born to these women,
directly infringe upon a woman's constitutional rights to be free from
bodily restraint, the right to bodily integrity, the right to privacy in
decisions affecting her pregnancy, and the right to parental
autonomy, which includes a mother's right to the care and custody
of her child. Accordingly, a state must prove it is using the least
intrusive means available to protect the interests of the unborn. 62
Many women who use drugs during their pregnancies do not
appreciate the harm that drug intake may have on their unborn.
Some pregnant women naively believe that the placenta forms a
barrier between themselves and their unborn, protecting their
unborn from exposure to the drugs they take.6 Since many women
are ignorant of the effects of drug use on their unborn, education
rather than detention would be a less intrusive means of protecting
the unborn. Rehabilitating women addicted to drugs also would be
less intrusive than taking custody of their newborn infants. In sum,
states do not have the right to detain pregnant women and remove
their children when less invasive means of protecting the unborn are
available, such as drug rehabilitation and education.

59 Id
60 In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 35, 500 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1986).
61 Id.
62 Supra note 11.
63 See Hillard, "Recreational"Dugs: Cocaine PAR.N'S, Jan. 1988, at 134, col. 1.
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In addition, a state must prove it has a compelling interest
before it can detain a pregnant woman against her will.6 A state
has a compelling interest in the fetus only after it has reached the
point of viability.6 Therefore, it would be unconstitutional to order
a woman detained prior to the viability of the fetus. Since maternal
drug abuse causes the greatest amount of damage to the unborn
during the first trimester of pregnancy,6 before a fetus has become
viable, the unborn is left unprotected from early drug abuse by state
measures directed at detention. Drug education and rehabilitation
of women of child bearing years would offer greater protection to
the unborn than would the detention of their mothers.
The removal of an infant born to a drug addicted mother is the
ultimate infringement of parental autonomy. Yet, the right to
parental autonomy is notunlimited.6 7 When a mother fails to meet
her basic duty to provide for her child, or when she abuses or
neglects it, states may take action to protect the child.6 Dr. Steve
Kandall, chief of neonatology at Beth Israel Hospital in New York,
argues that women who are addicted to drugs are not ideal mothers
for the purpose of bonding and interacting with babies.6 Indeed,
these women may have difficulty taking care of themselves. If the
state fails to remove the infants, social workers claim that drugaddicted women are likely to neglect or abuse their children. 70
While removal of the newborn may be necessary in some cases, it
should be ordered only temporarily to assist the mother in regaining
control of her life, so she can adequately care for her child.

64 Supra note 11.
65 Supra note 12.
66 BARNES, MmaicAL DIsoRDERS IN OB rE

67
68
69
70

c PRAcnCE 484 (4th ed. 1974).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
See id. at 166-67.
In re Baby X, note 58, at 116, 293 N.W.2d at 739.
Id.

1989]

MATERNAL RIGHTS AND PRENATAL ABUSE

143

3. CriminalIntervention
a. Case Study
The state of California has recently shown its willingness to
prosecute women who abuse drugs and fail to follow their doctors'
orders. In 1986, criminal charges were filed in California against
Pamela Stewart Monson for failing to take proper medical
precautions during her pregnancy. 71 The statute under which Pamela
was charged provides that a minor child's parent who willfully omits
to furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter, medical attendance, or
other remedial care for his or her child shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding $2,000, or by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by both
fine and imprisonment72
Prosecutors charged that on the day Pamela delivered, she took
amphetamines, used marijuana, and against her doctor's orders had
sexual intercourse with her husband.Y Pamela suffered from
placenta previa, a condition under which the baby's descent through
the birth canal tears the placenta from the uterine wall, causing
hemorrhaging and depriving the baby, sometimes fatally, of oxygen.74
Her doctor wafned her to seek medical care as soon as she started
bleeding, but Pamela failed to call the paramedics until twelve hours
after the bleeding began. 75 On November 23, 1985, her son was
born brain dead and amphetamines were found in his system; he
died January 1, 1986.76 The statute under which Pamela was
charged provided that a child conceived but not yet born is an
existing person.7 However, charges were eventually dismissed
because the judge determined the law which was alleged to have

71 People v. Pamela Rae Stewart Monson, No.M-508197 (Calif., filed May 13, 1986).
72 CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1987).
73 Sandroff, supra note 39.
74 Id
75 Id
76 Rust, Women Charged with PrenatalNeglect 29 AM. MED. NEWS, October 24, 1986,
at 1, col. 2.
77 Supra note 72.
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been violated was intended to enforce the parental obligation of
support.78
b. Critique
While the details of the Monson case are particularly shocking,
imposing criminal punishment on women for failing to take proper
care of themselves or to follow doctors' orders during pregnancy will
not protect or benefit the unborn. The prosecution of women for
negligent behavior during their pregnancies will not necessarily deter
this conduct.79 When a woman is negligent in regard to her own
body, it cannot be presumed that she knows the potential effects of
her acts on the fetus. A woman who is unaware of the risk she is
creating cannot be deterred from creating it by the threat of
punishment.80 Many women who are casual users of prescription, as
well as recreational, drugs may not believe that they have drug
problems or that their use of drugs may have any effect on their
unborn babies.
In addition, many have argued that the threat of criminal
punishment could actually injure the fetus by frightening pregnant
women away from seeking prenatal care."' This would be
regrettable, since it is the women who abuse drugs and negligently
care for themselves that are most in need of prenatal care. What
is more, prosecution of the mother after the birth of the child does
not help the child.
B. Possible Future State Intervention in the Area of Drug Abuse
1. Legislative Proposal
In response to the Monson decision, Senator Ed Royce
introduced a bill, SB1070, into the California State legislature to

78 Gianeli, supra note 43 at col. 4.

79 W.R. LAFAVE AND A.W. Scorr, CRmtNAL LAW 211 (1972).
80 Id
81 Zimmerman, When Mother's Rights Unborn Child's Collide, Whose Wins?, San Diego
Union, November 16, 1986, at C-1, col. 2.
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give prosecutors the authority to prosecute women who harmed their
unborn. 2 Although this proposed legislation died in the Senate
Judiciary Committee in January of 1988, Senator Royce reintroduced
the exact legislation as Senate Bill 1630. s3 If SB1630 passes, a
woman could be found guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony
if she willfully failed to follow her doctor's advice or engaged in,
other activites that caused harm to her unborn. Activities during
pregnancy such as riding in an automobile, flying, residing at high
altitudes or engaging in sexual intercourse could be grounds for
criminal punishment, since these activities have been shown to cause

fetal harm

4

Poor nutrition, smoking, or drinking coffee or alcohol

have also been shown to cause disorders in, and even death of, the
fetus." The concept of what constitutes prenatal abuse is gradually
being expanded, so that in some cases even a planned birth at home
has been described as an instance of prenatal abuse. 6
2. Critique

If such a bill were passed, the state could prosecute women for
any behavior having adverse effect on the fetus. "Given the fetus's
complete physical dependence on and interrelatedness with the body
of the woman, virtually every act of the pregnant woman has some
effect on the fetus," says attorney and ethicist Dawn Johnsen.8 7 The
state would have to police what pregnant women eat and drink as
well as the types of activities in which they engage.m
Furthermore, SB1630 is unconstitutionally overbroad since it
does not provide adequate notice to a woman of ordinary

82 Carson, Bill Offered Based On Pamela Rae Stewart Baby Case San Diego Union,
March 7, 1987, at A-3, col. 1.
83 Telephone conversation with Senator Royce's secretary on March 31, 1989.
84 Note, supra note 56.

85 Id.
86 Gallagher, The Fetus and the Law - Whose Life Is It Anyway?, Ms., September, 1984,

at 134.
87 See Note, supra note 56, at 605-6.
88 Id. at 619-20.
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intelligence that her contemplated conduct is prohibited.8 9 It holds
a woman criminally liable for activity which she could not reasonably
understand to be unlawful. 90 If a government interest can be
achieved by less restrictive means, the regulation is unconstitutionally
overbroad. 91 Prosecution for maternal misbehavior is one of the
most restrictive means of protecting potential life. It is also unlikely
to succeed in protecting the fetus from harm.
If SB1630 were passed, a mother's refusal to submit to fetal
surgery could be the basis for criminal prosecution if her refusal
resulted in harm to her fetus. In addition to newly developed
diagnostic techniques and surgical interventions employed specifically
to aid the fetus, the future holds promise for correcting inheritable
fetal defects by gene therapy. 92 Possibly, then, a woman who refuses
to submit to gene therapy in the future could be subject to criminal
sanctions, if her child were born with a genetic defect.
While a state may impose restrictions on a woman's
constitutional rights only after the fetus has reached the point of
viability, this point is being pushed back further and further by
medical technology. Today, a fetus born in the 25th gestational
week has a 50% chance of survival. 93 This means that a state has
the right to restrict a woman's freedoms, and under SB1630, to
impose criminal sanctions at earlier and earlier points in time.
Furthermore, if abortion is criminalized, the state may have the right
to intervene and control a pregnant woman's behavior from the
moment of conception.
Even more startling is the fact that a woman could be subject to
a standard of conduct for her entire lifetime priorto the conception
of her child. Negligent acts before conception that result in a
liveborn infant with injuries are actionable. 94 For example, MeadeJohnson Laboratories was successfully sued for manufacturing birth

89 See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
90 See id.
91 People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 113840, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364-65 (1984).
92 Shaw, ConditionalProspective Rights of the Fetus, 5 . LEGAL MED. 63, 80 (1984).
93 McLoughlin, America's New Civil War, U.S. NEws '& WoRLD REP., October 3, 1988
at 28, col. 1.
94 See Shaw, supra note 92, at 91.
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control pills which, when taken before conception, caused damage
to the chromosomes of the mother's ova, inducing Down's Syndrome
in twins born to the mother.9 Therefore, it is possible that a
woman could be subject to civil or criminal liability if she engaged
in negligent acts before conception and damaged her eggs which,
when later fertilized, resulted in injury to her liveborn infant.
Since crimmalizing maternal behavior would destroy a woman's
right to make important personal decisions regarding her body and
her liberty, the regulation would have to serve a compelling state
96
interest and achieve its objectives by the least intrusive means.
While a state has a compelling interest in the fetus at the point of
viability, the greatest damage to the unborn caused by the maternal
intake of drugs is during the first trimester of pregnancy, before the
point of viability. 97 Therefore, prosecuting a woman for drug use or
other maternal conduct causing injury to the unborn before the
point of viability would be unconstitutional.
Prosecution for maternal misbehavior is one of the most
intrusive means of protecting potential life, since it involves possible
imprisonment. Drug education, rehabilitation, counseling, and
prenatal care are less intrusive alternatives available to protect the
unborn. Furthermore, the fear of prosecution could cause many
women to forego prenatal care, which would endanger the unborn
rather than protect them.

95 Jorgensen v. Meade-Johnson Laboratones, 483 F 2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
96 Supra note 11.

97

BARNES,

supra note 66.
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i11
Proposals
A. The Problem with Regarding Maternal and Fetal Interests as
Being in Conflict
1. Medical Treatment
At one time, the medical community considered the fetus to be
a part of and inseparable from its mother. Now, due to medical
developments, health professionals have come to regard the fetus as
a separate patient which is treatable independent of its mother.9
Indeed, the law has responded by acknowledging that the fetus not
only has separate rights, but also has rights which conflict with those
of its mother. Regrettably, the courts may detain a pregnant
woman, compel her to submit to major surgery, and prosecute her
on behalf of her unborn.
State regulation of a pregnant woman's behavior "in the name
of fetal rights ... reflects a view of the fetus as an entity separate
from the pregnant woman, with interests that are hostile to her
interests."99 Because the relationship of a mother and her unborn
has come to be treated as one of conflict, states have seen fit to
intervene more extensively into the life of the mother in order to
protect the interests of the fetus.
Ironically, state intervention may not only affect a woman's
constitutional rights, but it may in fact harm the fetus. ACOG has
criticized state intervention which would compel a mother against
her objections to submit to treatment regimens in order to protect
the fetus. ACOG found that coercion could result in "undesirable
societal consequences" and could threaten the doctor-patient
relationship, 1' ° which could take an even greater toll on the health
of the unborn.

98 PmRTCHARD, supra note 16 at vii.
99 Note, supra note 56, at 613.
100 Gianeli, supra, note 43.
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State intrusion upon a mother's parental autonomy can actually
harm her unborn by impairing important emotional bonds between
a mother and her child. A mother who experiences a loss of
autonomy following the birth of a child may feel frustration, which
may have an unconscious impact on her relationship with her
child. 1 1 If the mother plans to raise the child herself, a healthy
relationship is important.'0 '
Court-ordered medical interventions or state regulation of a
pregnant woman's behavior clearly impairs a woman's parental
autonomy. This state intervention into the parent-child relationship
risks the destruction of fragile emotional bonds necessary to the
health of the child.
2. DrugAbuse
State officials may believe that detaining women who abuse
drugs is the only alternative in some cases. However, considering
the grave consequences to the fetus and the inability of the mother
to abstain, detention is no panacea. Civil commitment of pregnant
women may actually harm the fetus. The detention of a pregnant
woman may cause her adverse psychological effects which in turn
are likely to affect the fetus, because a mother and her fetus are
linked physiologically. 1' 3 Psychological studies show that "a mother
can pass on to her fetus her sense of helplessness or shock.
Additionally, a mother's emotional distress can cause pregnancy
4
disorders, premature delivery, or still birth."'
Yet, the interests of the mother and her unborn, rather than
being distinct and conflicting, are intimately bound. Mother and
fetus are tied together both physiologically and emotionally. Thus,
the needs of the unborn cannot be met unless the needs of the
mother are met.

101 Note, ConstitutionalLimitationson State Intervention in PrenatalCare, 67 VA. L REV.
1051, 1065 (1981).
102 See id
103 Id
104 It
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B. Expanding State Assistance
Women who abuse drugs or negligently care for themselves
during their pregnancies need help, not prosecution. States can best
protect the interests of the fetus by offering the mother assistance
rather than intervention, and choices rather than coercion.
Because social service spending has been cut, increasing numbers
of women suffer from inadequate nutrition, shelter, and medical
coverage during their pregnancies. 105 In addition, while state
prenatal care programs do exist, many are not equipped to handle
the number of women requiring their services. 106
Inadequate nutrition and poor health may cause prenatal harm.107
Certainly, states could better protect the interests of the unborn by
providing adequate social services and prenatal care to needy
women, rather than by imposing criminal liability on the women who
are incapable of adequately caring for themselves. A state cannot
fairly prosecute women who cause harm to their unborn because
they are too poor to afford adequate nutrition, shelter, and prenatal
care.
The fetus can be better protected from prenatal abuse if states
insist upon the labeling and publication of products and drugs
proven harmful to the fetus. Recently, local establishments that sell
alcohol have been required to post warnings, cautioning pregnant
women that alcohol can cause birth defects. 1°8 This is a start.
Many women are not even aware of the harm that some drugs
may have on their unborn. Therefore, educating pregnant women
as to substances and activities that may be harmful to their unborn
children is crucial.
States should establish widespread drug
education programs aimed at women of child-bearing age, pregnant
women, high school students, recreational drug users, and high risk
groups.

105 Takas, supra note. 30, col. 3.
106 Moore, Origel, Key, Resnik, The PerinatalandEconomic Impact of PrenatalCarein
a Low Socioeconomic Population, 154 AM. J. OBsiE. GYNECOL 29 (1986).
107 REEDER, supra note 41, at 56.
108 CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 25249.6 (1986).
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Rather than detaining pregnant women who abuse drugs and
removing their children from them, states should expand their drug
rehabilitation centers in order to assist women to "overcome their
drug dependencies, preferrably before conception. Non-threatening
counseling could be provided by former drug users who, as a result
of their drug use, have borne defective children. Even more
effective might be supervised visits to hospitals that care for drugafflicted infants. Nothing could be more sobering and have more of
an impact on a pregnant woman who abuses drugs than the
inconsolable crying of a malformed baby.

Conclusion
States should provide drug education, prenatal care, and drug
treatment programs; not detention, removal, and prosecution. While
the drug problem is very real and the devastating effects on the
unborn are heartbreaking, state intervention cannot protect the
interests of the unborn to the degree that state assistance can.
Policies aimed at criminalizing any behavior of a pregnant woman
that causes harm to the unborn are overbroad and violate a
woman's constitutional rights to privacy, parental autonomy, bodily
integrity, and freedom from bodily restraint.
The relationship of the mother and her unborn is a unique one.
Actions taken against one will affect the other. Coerced medical
interventions not only violate a woman's constitutional rights, but
they also may risk her life, and may be of limited benefit to her
unborn. Since it is the woman who bears the consequences, it is
she who should make the decision. Therefore, states should support
the relationship of the mother and her unborn; where they can
assist, they should not intervene.

